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DECONSTRUCTING NONDELEGATION
CYNTHIA R. FARINA*

This Essay suggests that the persistence of debates over delegation
to agencies cannot persuasively be explained as a determination final‐
ly to get constitutional law “right,” for nondelegation doctrine—at
least as traditionally stated—does not rest on a particularly sound
legal foundation. Rather, these debates continue because nondelega‐
tion provides a vehicle for pursuing a number of different concerns
about the modern regulatory state. Whether or not one shares these
concerns, they are not trivial, and we should voice and engage them
directly rather than continue to use nondelegation as a stalking horse.

If Academy Awards were given in constitutional jurispru‐
dence, nondelegation claims against regulatory statutes would
win the prize for Most Sympathetic Judicial Rhetoric in a
Hopeless Case. At the end of the nineteenth century, Justice
Harlan, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, declared:
“That congress cannot delegate legislative power . . . is a prin‐
ciple universally recognized as vital to the integrity and main‐
tenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu‐
tion.”1 At the beginning of the twenty‐first century, Justice
Scalia, for a unanimous Court, insisted: “Article I, § 1, of the
Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Power herein granted . . . in
a Congress of the United States’ . . . [and] permits no delegation
of those powers.”2 Yet in both these cases—and in virtually
every intervening delegation challenge—the court sustained
the statute at issue.3 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s opinion, which fol‐
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Director, Cornell e‐Rulemaking Initia‐
tive (CeRI); Director, Cornell Law & Public Policy Program.
1. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
2. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (first alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
3. See PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN &
BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 66–77 (rev. 10th ed. 2003).
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lowed an array of interesting and sophisticated D.C. Circuit
opinions debating the constitutionality of delegating authori‐
ty to the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards,4 is
one of the blandest, most pedantic opinions the Justice has
ever penned. He stops just short of consigning this ostensibly
vital and unqualified constitutional principle to the nether‐
world of nonjusticiability.5 Like the Ninth Amendment and
the Guaranty Clause, nondelegation appears to be a constitu‐
tional lost cause.6
The courts’ hesitance to enforce nondelegation, however,
does not deter challenges to the legality of regulatory delega‐
tions. Symposia devoted to the debate appear with regulari‐
ty,7 and nondelegation articles often appear in symposia on
other topics as well.8 Earlier this year at a conference on pres‐
idential power, Judge Ginsburg reiterated his conviction that
delegations such as those in the Clean Air Act are constitu‐
tionally unacceptable and deprecated what he views as judi‐
cial abdication to legislative judgment.9 In remarks conclud‐
ing the conference, Professor Steven Calabresi proposed
forcing Congress to reconsider the scope of hundreds of fed‐
eral programs by treating the legislative veto provisions that
4. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Am.
Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
5. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (“[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to
second‐guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that
can be left to those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
6. State constitutional opinions similarly tend to begin with a ringing declara‐
tion of the constitutional centrality of an absolute nondelegation principle, after
which they sustain the challenged statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse
Comm’n v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co., 37 N.W. 782, 786–88 (Minn.
1888); Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton Coun‐
ty, 1 Ohio St. 77, 87–91 (1852).
7. E.g., Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from Con‐
stitutional and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999).
8. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 DUKE
L.J. 5 (2000); Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, the Separation of
Powers, and the Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1750–51 (2006); Jim Ros‐
si, “Statutory Nondelegation”: Learning from Florida’s Recent Experience in Administra‐
tive Procedure Reform, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 301 (1999).
9. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Ex‐
ecutive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2009). Judge Ginsburg was in the
majority of the panel that initially held the delegation unconstitutional, Am. Truck‐
ing Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1033, and then denied the government’s petition for rehear‐
ing, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 195 F.3d at 6.
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commonly accompanied regulatory delegations before INS v.
Chadha10 as nonseverable.11
This Essay reflects on the remarkable durability of nondele‐
gation arguments. It begins by exploring why the legal case
against delegation is not sufficiently robust to account for the
persistence of the nondelegation debate in the face of nearly
two hundred years of rejection by the courts12 and political
branches. It suggests that the controversy endures because
nondelegation offers a vehicle for pursuing several serious
concerns about federal regulation. Each of these concerns at
least arguably implicates constitutional values, and all arise
from the cumulative effect of Congress’s practice of broad dele‐
gation over time rather than from the act of delegating itself. As
a simultaneously time‐honored and perennially unpersuasive
framing, nondelegation provides a constitutional home for
these concerns but ultimately prevents the kind of direct en‐
gagement on the merits that they deserve.
I.
The existence of a constitutional nondelegation principle is
typically accepted as given, so the focus of debate moves im‐
mediately to whether the existing doctrinal approach correctly
operationalizes this principle. But consider, for a moment, the
basis for assuming that the Constitution forbids Congress to
give significant policymaking authority to another entity, such
as a regulatory agency. The Constitution’s text is of little help,
for it says nothing explicit about delegating the power Article I
confers.13 The early cases that vehemently pronounced the in‐
10. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
11. See Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law Symposium: Presidential Power in Historical Pers‐
pective (Feb. 7, 2009).
12. The earliest federal nondelegation challenges—and losses—came within
decades of the ratification of the Constitution. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
382 (1813).
13. Some scholars do insist that the Article I vesting clause itself establishes the
nondelegation principle. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelega‐
tion: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 807 (1999) (“The language of the Con‐
stitution would seem to prescribe a bright‐line doctrinal approach.”). With re‐
spect, this position seems unsupportable. Within our legal system, a simple grant
of power without more does not conclusively resolve whether or when an agent
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dispensability of a nondelegation principle invariably spent
their energy demonstrating why the statutes under attack did
not violate the principle, rather than explaining the principle’s
origins.14 Moreover, these demonstrations were largely func‐
tional assessments of the pragmatic needs of government. The
conspicuous absence of typical constitutional interpretive con‐
cerns with text, intent, and purpose, coupled with the presenta‐
tion of delegation as self‐evidently problematic and the focus
on practical justifiability, suggests that these courts were draw‐
ing on background legal understandings neither specific to the
Constitution nor open to serious contention.
In other words, nondelegation cases historically looked more
like the ordinary application of general common law principles
than like extraordinary moments of constitutional exegesis. For
example, a mid‐nineteenth century Ohio Supreme Court opi‐
nion—eventually quoted approvingly by Justice Harlan in Field
v. Clark15—describes as “too clear for argument” the proposi‐
tion that “the general assembly can not surrender any portion
of the legislative authority with which it is invested, or author‐
ize its exercise by any other person or body.”16 The court ex‐
plained: “This inability arises no less from the general principle
applicable to every delegated power requiring knowledge, dis‐
cretion, and rectitude, in its exercise, than from the positive
provisions of the constitution itself.”17 Similarly, when Chief
Justice Taft established the modern “intelligible principle”
standard in 1928, he placed nondelegation squarely on ordi‐
nary contractual principles:
can subdelegate. See infra text accompanying notes 20–39. Moreover, if the Article
I vesting clause prevents delegation, so, it would seem, must the Article II and III
vesting clauses. Yet the President’s ability to delegate executive power is well
established. See infra text accompanying notes 27–28. As for Article III, the rela‐
tionship between Article III judges and non‐Article III decision‐makers, such as
magistrates and bankruptcy judges, is a perennial conceptual maze. See RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED‐
ERAL SYSTEM 363 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that “the Supreme Court has brought little
but confusion to this area”). It blinks reality, however, to assert that no part of the
judicial power of the United States has been delegated to those officials.
14. See, e.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405–11 (1928);
Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton County, 1
Ohio. St. 77, 87–88 (1852).
15. 143 U.S. 649, 693–94 (1892).
16. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co., 1 Ohio St. at 87.
17. Id.

No. 1]

Deconstructing Nondelegation

91

The well‐known maxim “Delegata potestas non potest dele‐
gari” [“No delegated powers can be further delegated”], ap‐
plicable to the law of agency in the general and common
law, is well understood and has had wider application in the
construction of our Federal and State Constitutions than it
has in private law.18

Modern explanations of nondelegation emphasize political
theory rather than the common law, tracing the principle to John
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government.19 Even in Locke, though,
the contractual paradigm is evident, with the legislative part of
government conceptualized as receiving its power from the
people “by positive voluntary Grant” to act as their agent.20
It is thus worth considering what agency law actually says
about an agent’s authority to delegate further the power con‐
ferred by the principal. According to the first Restatement of
Agency, the general rule is indeed that, “[u]nless otherwise
agreed, authority to conduct a transaction does not include au‐
thority to delegate to another the performance of acts incidental
thereto which involve discretion or the agent’s special skill.”21
Yet this rule—captured in the delegata potestas maxim—only
begins the analysis. A second general rule is that “authority to
conduct a transaction includes authority to do acts which are
incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably neces‐
18. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 405–06.
19. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672–73
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports
of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1297, 1297 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1725, 1729 (2002).
20. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 141 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. 1980) (1690). Locke wrote:
The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they, who
have it, cannot pass it over to others. . . . And when the people have said,
We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men,
and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for
them; nor can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted
by those, whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them.
The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive
voluntary grant and institution, can be no other, than what the positive
grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of
making laws, and place it in other hands.
Id. at ¶ 141 (emphasis omitted).
21. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 78 (1933).
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sary to accomplish it.”22 This authority includes the power to
appoint other agents or subagents when such appointment is
“reasonably require[d]”23 or “it is impracticable for the agent to
perform [the task] in person.”24 The rationale for this second
rule is straightforward and sensible: Because “[a]ll authority is
granted for the accomplishment of certain purposes of the
principal,”25 “it is inferred that the principal is not doing a vain
thing, but intends to give a workable and effective consent”26
when creating the agency relationship.
Although the delegata potestas maxim is more familiar, this
second general rule of agency law is no stranger to structural
constitutional interpretation. Indeed, it is central to how scho‐
lars understand the authority conferred by the People in Article
II: The President may delegate his power to subagents because
delegation is reasonably necessary to accomplish his constitu‐
tional functions.27 Presidential delegation rests no more ex‐
pressly on the text than does congressional delegation. Indeed,
the President is not explicitly authorized, as Congress is, to
take actions “which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution” constitutionally conferred powers.28 Particular‐
ly in light of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is difficult to
understand why background principles of agency law would
operate more restrictively when it comes to appointing sub‐
agents necessary to accomplish the “purposes of the princip‐
al”29—that is, the people—in Article I than in Article II. Of
course, broad grants of regulatory power to administrative

22. Id. § 35.
23. Id. § 79 (“[A]n agent is authorized to appoint another agent for the principal
if,” among other contingencies, “the proper conduct of the principal’s business in
the contemplated manner reasonably requires the employment of other agents.”).
24. Id. § 80 (“[A]uthority to appoint a subagent is inferred from authority to
conduct a transaction for the principal if,” among other things, “the business is of
such a nature . . . that it is impracticable for the agent to perform it in person.”).
25. Id. § 34 cmt. d.
26. Id. § 35 cmt. c.
27. E.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1242 (1994) (“Of course, the President cannot be expected personally to
execute all laws.”).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 34 cmt. d.
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agencies can be justified as “reasonably require[d]”30 subdele‐
gations only if achievement of the statutory objectives is within
the charge that the people, through the Constitution and the
ordinary political process, have given Congress to accomplish.
The scope of Congress’s authority is thus an important issue, to
which this Essay will return shortly.
Another basic component of agency law is worth noting: the
impact of changed conditions. When a principal engages an
agent to act for him over time, the scope of actual authority
cannot be static or the course of external events might leave the
agent unable to achieve the goals of the principal. The general
rule, therefore, is that “authorization is interpreted as of the time
it is acted upon, in light of the conditions under which it was
made and changes in conditions subsequent thereto.”31 As a
result, “a change of circumstances may increase, diminish, or
terminate [the agent’s] privilege to exercise a power for the
principal.”32 The principal need not have anticipated the conse‐
quences of the changed conditions.33 To be sure, what ultimate‐
ly defines the agent’s actual authority is “the principal’s ma‐
nifestations of consent to him.”34 But this inquiry asks whether
the “conduct of the principal . . . , reasonably interpreted, caus‐
es the agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act
on the principal’s account.”35 When the agent is acting under
substantially changed circumstances, the consent of the prin‐
cipal is reasonably inferred if “the principal is aware of the
change and its effect and is in a position to change his orders if
he desires such change.”36 More generally, an inference of au‐
thority reasonably arises when the agent performs “a series of
acts of a similar nature” and the principal, knowing of those
acts, does not manifest disapproval.37
30. Id. § 79 (“[A]n agent is authorized to appoint another agent for the principal
if . . . the proper conduct of the principal’s business in the contemplated manner
reasonably requires the employment of other agents.”).
31. Id. § 33 (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 33 cmt. a.
33. Id. § 35 cmt. c (“It is not essential to the authorization of an act that the prin‐
cipal should have contemplated that the agent would perform it as incidental to
the authorized performance.”).
34. Id. § 7.
35. Id. § 26.
36. Id. § 33 cmt. a.
37. Id. § 43 cmt. b.
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All these principles of agency law go to the scope of the
agent’s actual authority. They are not defining the “apparent”
authority upon which a third party may reasonably rely but
which does not alter the relationship between the agent and his
principal,38 nor are they addressing the distinct question of when
an agent’s unauthorized acts can be legitimated after the fact by
the principal’s affirmance or ratification.39 They comprise the
primary framework for defining the bounds of the agent’s legi‐
timate authority to act—a framework in which constraint on
(sub)delegation is only one of several interrelated components.
Within this framework, the historical course of nondelega‐
tion jurisprudence is more explicable. Delegata potestas non pot‐
est delegari begins, but does not end, judicial analysis. The
pragmatic assessment of government needs40 and the notice
taken of changing national and international circumstances41—
inquiries that seem odd, perhaps even irresponsible, as part of
enforcing a fundamental constitutional prohibition—are quite
unexceptional ways to determine whether a general agent may
lawfully delegate power to others to perform tasks “impractic‐
able for the agent to perform . . . in person.”42 Indeed, in United
States v. Grimaud, a famous early twentieth century case that
rejects a nondelegation challenge to a criminal conviction for
violating an administrative regulation, the Court made explicit
the common law reasoning that informed the constitutional
inquiry: “Congress might rightfully entrust” to others the pow‐
er to make regulations just “as an owner may delegate to his

38. See, e.g., id. §§ 49, 159 (discussing apparent authority and the rules that apply
to unauthorized acts taken under apparent authority).
39. See id. §§ 82–84, 93 (defining ratification and affirmance).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1911) (noting that “[i]n
the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regula‐
tions for these various and varying details of management” of federal reserved
lands).
41. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increa‐
singly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives.”).
42. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 80 (“[A]uthority to appoint a subagent is
inferred from authority to conduct a transaction for the principal” if, among other
things, “the business is of such a nature . . . that it is impracticable for the agent to
perform it in person.”).
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principal agent the right to employ subordinates, giving to
them a limited discretion.”43
II.
In sum, the indefatigable fervor with which we cling to non‐
delegation arguments is difficult to justify based on either the
language of the Constitution or the background understand‐
ings of agency law from which the delegata potestas maxim de‐
rives. Rather, it appears to be anxiety about the consequences
of two centuries of statutory delegation to agencies that keeps
the delegation debate alive. This disquiet about modern regula‐
tory government comprises several distinct concerns.
The first is that broad congressional delegation to agencies
has made it too easy for the federal government to establish,
over time, a huge regulatory regime reaching virtually every
significant aspect of our social and economic lives. Lawyers
and political scientists alike have charged that delegation
enables the legislature to punt the really tough policy choices.44
Because Congress can do more when it is allowed to do less,
the result has been a proliferation of federal social and econom‐
ic regulation, much of which arguably should not exist. The
constitutionally based version of this concern, most clearly arti‐
culated by Gary Lawson, sees overly broad constructions of the
Commerce Clause, the spending power, and the Necessary and
Proper Clause as working in conjunction with overly narrow
applications of the Due Process and Takings Clauses and the
Tenth Amendment to allow the national government a far
greater scope of action than was originally intended.45 Uncon‐
strained delegation enables Congress to exploit these interpre‐
tive errors to the fullest, producing a regime of unconstitution‐
al federal regulatory overreaching.46 The policy based version
insists that, as a matter of good government, less is more. Dele‐
gation has made it so easy to create federal regulatory pro‐
grams that the national government now intervenes in matters
43. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF
THE UNITED STATES 92–126 (2d ed. 1979); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
45. Lawson, supra note 27, at 1233–37.
46. Id. at 1237–41.
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that the market, or local governments, would more efficiently
and effectively manage.47 A related worry is that delegation has
expanded the federal regulatory agenda to the point of irre‐
deemable unmanageability.48 Were Congress forced to focus
and prioritize more, the regulation that does result could be
better coordinated, assessed, and adjusted.
Even those who (like the Author) do not share this concern at
the wholesale level would find it hard to deny that careful at‐
tention to the “whether,” “who,” and “how” of regulation in
specific circumstances is important, and often lacking. At‐
tempting to remedy this deficit through nondelegation, how‐
ever, merely diverts the focus to questions, such as the adequa‐
cy of particular statutory standards, that are tendentious and
ultimately trivial in comparison to the underlying issues.
A second concern is that allowing Congress to avoid the
kinds of detailed policy specification that would founder in the
bicameralism and presentment process has increased the pro‐
duction of federal statutory law. Insightful articles by Jonathan
Macey49 and others50 have demonstrated how the Article I, Sec‐
tion 7, lawmaking requirements work in practice to restrict the
production of legislation and preserve the status quo. The his‐
tory of the Framing provides some basis for believing that an
antistatute bias was deliberate. State constitutions adopted
shortly after the Revolution reacted to perceived abuses of the
king by creating government structures dominated by a popu‐
larly elected, often unicameral, legislature.51 Many of these leg‐
islatures dealt with the economic chaos and hardship of the
post‐war period by passing statutes that cancelled private (as
well as public) debt and took various other steps endangering
47. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 106–10 (1990) (advocating, among other things, “a presump‐
tion in favor of flexible, market‐oriented, incentive‐based, and decentralized regu‐
latory strategies”).
48. Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993) (describing the overlap, inconsistency, and irrationality
of health and safety regulatory programs).
49. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public‐Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
50. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7
Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528–29 (1992).
51. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 214–21 (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 403–13 (2d ed. 1998).
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existing property rights.52 Hence, for many of the well‐
propertied Framers, the course of events between 1779 and
1787 demonstrated that popularly elected legislatures were in‐
clined to be reckless and that legislation threatened property.
So it is not implausible to argue that less federal statutory law
is itself an original constitutional value.53
Even if this were true, a meaningful question remains: What
weight should we accord today to a Framing‐era distrust of
legislation? We now recognize that the common law is itself a
system of government regulation—no more the “natural” order
of things than any other legal approach. With the post‐
eighteenth‐century spread of democratic government struc‐
tures, statutory law created by popularly elected officials has
become the preeminent form of social ordering in industrial
and post‐industrial societies. It now seems quaint, if not actual‐
ly undemocratic, to treat statutes as a suspect incursion on
judge‐made law.54 To interpret our Constitution as locking in
one particular approach to regulating social and economic ac‐
tivity—particularly, a court‐centered approach—uncomfortably
highlights the “dead hand” potential of a two‐hundred‐year‐
old document. It threatens to make the Constitution irrelevant
in a society whose more recent political history has included
not only President Roosevelt’s New Deal and President John‐
son’s Great Society, but also at least three decades of well‐
documented public opinion insisting that the federal govern‐
ment should take responsibility for solving environmental,
health and safety, educational, and other core social problems.55
52. RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 216; WOOD, supra note 51, at 403–13.
53. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51
DUKE L.J. 901, 910–20 (2001).
54. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 201 (1999) (“[T]he domin‐
ance of statute law in modern government requires reconsideration of the pre‐
sumption that . . . statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowly
construed.”); PETER L. STRAUSS, LEGISLATION: UNDERSTANDING AND USING STA‐
TUTES 144–51 (2006) (noting that the early twentieth century “was a time when
statutes began to replace case decision (i.e. the common law) as the primary
source of law in American jurisprudence”).
55. See Christopher Ellis & James A. Stimson, Operational and Symbolic Ide‐
ology in the American Electorate: The “Paradox” Revisited 2–5, 37 (Apr. 7,
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p85321_index.html (reviewing data from 1970–2002 showing that Americans, on
average, prefer policies through which the government spends and does more to
solve social problems, and that this clear preference varies within a relatively
small range, never quite touching the neutral point even at its most extreme con‐
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It now seems more important to consider how Article I, Sec‐
tion 7 operates within the regulatory system that Americans of
the twentieth and twenty‐first centuries have chosen. Stability
in regulatory programs, as in law more generally, is valuable; it
enables private planning and protects expectations. Entrench‐
ment is dangerous because some degree of regulatory failure—
approaches that produce unintended negative consequences,
impose disproportionate social costs, and so on56—is inevitable
given the complexity and intractability of the problems Ameri‐
cans now expect government to solve. The constitutionally spe‐
cified process makes amending and repealing statutes as diffi‐
cult as enacting them. Indeed, once regulatory programs have
given rise to communities of interest in their continuation,
amending or repealing a regulatory statute may be more diffi‐
cult than enacting it in the first place.57 Ambitious regulatory
agendas require adaptability if they are not to do more harm
than good. Given the status‐quo‐favoring bias of the Article I,
Section 7, process, less specificity in regulatory statutes may,
ironically, be a virtue rather than a vice.58
This observation leads to what is doubtless the most broad‐
ly resonant set of concerns voiced through the rubric of non‐
delegation: Delegating so much policymaking power to ad‐
ministrative agencies has created serious problems of control
and accountability. Agencies, according to this critique, are
making policy with little external oversight and less democratic
accountability to the people.
We have good reason to worry about these things. Currently,
close to two hundred distinct entities have rulemaking authori‐
ty—that is, the power to make regulations having the force of
servative moments); see also Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort & Impossible Promises:
Information Overload, Uncertainty and the Unitary Executive, U. PA. J. CONST. L.
(forthcoming) (on file with author) (reviewing political science literature on the
majority’s “liberal” regulatory preferences).
56. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 107–09.
57. For example, the emergence of the lucrative environmental cleanup industry
is often blamed for difficulty in amending the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith,
Hope and Rationality: Or, Public Choice and the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 109, 123–24 (2000).
58. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 48, at 39–42 (identifying “congressional reaction
to perceived risk and to regulatory problems, which takes the form of detailed
statutory instructions,” as one significant cause of inefficient, ineffective regula‐
tion).
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law.59 They make about four thousand rules per year,60 an av‐
erage of seventy‐five per week. To be sure, many of these are
minor or uncontroversial. But, as administrative law profes‐
sors know well, rules are only one of the many ways in which
agencies make important regulatory policy. They issue “guid‐
ance” documents that, as a practical matter, the regulated
community ignores only at its peril;61 they grant permits and
other authorizations; they require product recalls and under‐
take enforcement actions. Agencies even make significant regu‐
latory choices by not acting. Consider that Massachusetts v.
EPA,62 which many know (not quite correctly) as directing the
EPA to regulate greenhouse gases, arose from the agency’s de‐
cision not to begin a rulemaking.63 The extent and diversity of
regulatory activity is so great that we actually do not know,
empirically, how many of these activities occur across the fed‐
eral government annually.
For cognitive and psychological reasons, humans seek to
simplify complexity.64 The nondelegation doctrine, as tradition‐
ally articulated, represents one simplifying response to the con‐
cern that the mass of federal regulatory policymaking power is
uncontrolled and unaccountable: Congress itself should exercise
the power. A more recent twist presents a different simplifying
response: The President should exercise, or at least direct the
exercise of, the power. This unconventional deployment of
nondelegation reasoning goes like this: Although the Court has
“almost never felt qualified to second‐guess Congress regard‐
ing the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left

59. COMM. ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF FED. E‐RULEMAKING, ACHIEVING THE
POTENTIAL: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E‐RULEMAKING 3 (2008), available at http://
ceri.law.cornell.edu/documents/report‐web‐version.pdf [hereinafter ACHIEVING
THE POTENTIAL].
60. John Ashlin et al., Regulations.gov Federal Regulatory Portal, 30 J. GOV’T INFO.
81, 82 (2004).
61. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring
Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803 (2001).
62. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
63. See id. at 511. Although the case was widely reported as requiring the EPA to
regulate, the majority held only that the EPA has authority to regulate carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse emissions and must provide a rational, legally valid
explanation for not doing so. See id. at 533.
64. See Farina, supra note 55.
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to “agencies in regulatory statutes,”65 the Constitution “permits
no delegation of [Article I] powers.”66 Therefore, the power exer‐
cised by agencies in regulatory programs that have passed con‐
stitutional muster by satisfying the “intelligible principle” stan‐
dard67 cannot be legislative power. Rather, as the Constitution
speaks of only three types of power, the authority conferred in
regulatory statutes must be executive power. “To be sure, some
administrative agency action—rulemaking, for example—may
resemble ‘lawmaking.’”68 But “a certain degree of discretion, and
thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action.”69
Because Article II vests the President with all the federal execu‐
tive power, the President’s duty to take care that federal law be
faithfully executed entails the power to direct the decisions of
regulatory decision‐makers.70
Either simple solution to the concern about control and ac‐
countability of regulatory policymaking—the power should be
wielded either by Congress or by the President—will be, at
best, inadequate and disappointing. The sheer size and com‐
plexity of the federal regulatory enterprise defeats rational,
coordinated, democratically responsive decision making by any
single entity, be it the 535 members of Congress or the 1,500
people in the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President who
are the President’s eyes, ears, and often voice with respect to
regulatory decisions.71 Even with respect to particular, highly
salient regulatory policy choices, it is far from obvious that a
congressional or presidential decision is a significant gain in
democratic control and accountability. As the judiciary has ela‐
borated on the basic procedural framework of the Administra‐
65. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (quoting Mi‐
stretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
66. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
67. See J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
68. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983).
69. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord. Freytag v. Comm’r,
501 U.S. 868, 912 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg‐
ment) (“It seems to me entirely obvious that the Tax Court, like the Internal Reve‐
nue Service, the FCC, and the NLRB, exercises executive power.”); Chadha, 462
U.S. at 953 n.16 (“It is clear, therefore, that the Attorney General acts in his pre‐
sumptively Art. II capacity when he administers the Immigration and Nationality
Act.”).
70. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 29 (2008).
71. See LYN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY 253, 257–62 (1996).

No. 1]

Deconstructing Nondelegation

101

tive Procedure Act, agency decision making is often far more
broadly participatory, transparent, and publicly justified than is
congressional or presidential action. Moreover, the growing in‐
terest in using the Internet and other information and communi‐
cation technologies in the regulatory process—e‐government—
has great potential to make agency decision making even more
open, comprehensible, and accessible to citizens.72
Absent a fundamental revision in Americans’ expectations of
what the federal government should accomplish, we must rely
on multiple entities and processes to meet the challenge of
democratic control and accountability in the regulatory state:
the House and the Senate through their overlapping, and often
competing, oversight and appropriations committees;73 the
multiple centers of executive influence in the Cabinet and the
various White House offices that orbit the President and often
compete to be his authentic voice in the administration;74 the
courts in their role as reviewers; and private individuals, enti‐
ties, and interest groups in their role as litigants, lobbyists, re‐
peat players, and watchdogs.
III.
For nearly a century, Congresses and Presidents of both par‐
ties have responded to perceived economic and social prob‐
lems by creating regulatory agencies that wield substantial po‐
licymaking authority. For decades, public opinion polls have
revealed solid and remarkably stable majority support for ac‐
tive federal government engagement in environmental, health
and safety, and economic issues. If all this is not the authentic
working out of representative democracy, then it is hard to see
what self‐government would mean for the people of a large,
heterogeneous nation. Of course, legitimate government action
in our system is subject to the proviso that simple majoritarian
preferences may not override requirements and prohibitions of
72. See ACHIEVING THE POTENTIAL, supra note 59, at 8–11.
73. In the 110th Congress, more than twenty‐five committees and subcommit‐
tees have jurisdiction over the EPA and its regulatory programs. See U.S. EPA,
MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WITH JURISDICTION OVER EPA ISSUES 1–3,
http://epa.gov/ocir/leglibrary/pdf/110housejuris.pdf.
74. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Admin‐
istrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV.
47, 68–69 (2006).
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the Constitution. But it is hardly surprising that courts would
not deploy a prohibition that is neither explicit in the constitu‐
tional text nor absolute in the background common law under‐
standings to block sociopolitical developments that have bipar‐
tisan, cross‐branch, and enduring popular support.
The real problem with framing concerns about regulatory
government as a question of power is that when the inevitable
confirmation of congressional authority comes, we tend to act
as if there is nothing more to say. Debates about whether Con‐
gress can delegate have crowded out debates about whether
Congress ought to delegate. Do we really believe that the sum
and substance of congressional and presidential responsibility
is to avoid doing that which they are prohibited from doing?
Surely the power that we, the people, have given them through
the Constitution comes impressed with an obligation to reflect
carefully upon whether what may be done should be done.
Whether or not any of the various concerns that continue to
impel “nondelegation talk” merit a systemic revision of U.S.
regulatory objectives and structures, they should be part of se‐
rious discussion about regulatory proposals in Congress, the
White House, and broader public discourse. Continuing to sub‐
limate these concerns in an ultimately unproductive argument
about constitutional first principles disserves us all.

